

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CORPS: EVOLVING INTO THE 21ST
CENTURY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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For the past two decades the Military Intelligence (MI) Officer Corps of the United States Army, has evolved in response to legislative requirements, organizational culture and the changing security environment of the nation. Throughout these transitions, the basic challenge to acquire enough officers to meet field grade requirements has resulted in several initiatives. At the same time, the MI Corps has sought to develop and refine areas of expertise within the profession. The future readiness and strength of the MI field grade officer cadre hinge on successful acceptance and integration of branch transfer officers and the Functional Area 34 / Strategic Intelligence career field programs. Misperceptions of these programs have resulted in uninformed decisions and organizational assumptions that have prevented a unified Army MI effort. A sense of unity and identity within Army MI can be achieved by strategic leadership involvement in educating the force on evolving Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) initiatives, MI accessions initiatives, legislative requirements, and the value of diversity amongst the force in the formation of intelligence-specific areas of concentration. Army strategic leader vision and commitment to bring together a united, synchronized, intelligence officer cadre is critical in shaping a strong, relevant MI Corps for the future.

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CORPS: EVOLVING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

This paper outlines the evolution of the Army Military Intelligence (MI) officer corps from the early 1980's to present day. It begins with a historical overview of past and present MI challenges and initiatives. The focus then shifts to the impact of external factors such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI Task Force and how MI responded and adapted internally to these influences. Specifically, the Branch Detail Program and the formation of a new strategic intelligence functional area (FA) are explored to better understand the organizational culture within MI and how current dilemmas and challenges emerged. Lastly, recommendations are provided in an effort to strike an effective balance between meeting the urgent needs of today while still setting the right conditions for the future.

Historical Challenges and Initiatives

For over two decades,¹ Army Military Intelligence (MI) has struggled with higher officer field grade requirements than the company grade base can provide; requiring the branch to acquire and assimilate officers from other branches into the Intelligence Corps to meet its field grade commitments. Additionally, Army intelligence has always been faced with the challenge of creating expertise that spans tactical, operational, and strategic echelons. Each echelon is comprised of very different consumers as well as different realms of collection, production, and analysis.² The Branch Detail Program and the former 35B/Strategic Intelligence specialty were designed to mitigate both challenges; however, these initiatives were not enough to keep the Army intelligence officer corps healthy without dedicated senior leadership oversight.

In the early 1980's Military Intelligence participated in the pre-cursor to the Branch Detail Program, which was called the Force Alignment Program (FAP).³ In the FAP, officers were notified between their fourth and sixth year of service that they were being transferred from an over-strength branch, such as combat arms, to an under strength branch such as MI. This program was not well received by the field since officers were often given short notice of the transfer and had little to no input on whether they remained in their original basic branch or not. While the FAP looked good on paper in realigning numbers and ranks with mission requirements, upon implementation the sense of unpredictability and little input from the affected officers was met with resentment and resistance. Challenges arose in trying to retain and integrate officers into branches they had little or no desire to be realigned into. The goals and end-state of the FAP were logical; however, the strategy and implementation strained the

human dimension of the officer corps and therefore was quickly adjusted. By the mid-1980's officers in branches with high lieutenant requirements but lower field grade requirements were given a vote, up-front, as to what branch they would be detailed in following their initial commitment. This new system, the Branch Detail Program, allowed officers to voluntarily participate and instituted a new system that informed the officers and branches, years ahead, of future transitions.

The Branch Detail Program is a "borrowing" process that is administered by Human Resources Command (HRC) according to the provisions of Army Regulation 614-100. The program works to identify branches with large lieutenant requirements which reside mostly in combat arms (e.g., Infantry and Armor) against branches with low lieutenant requirements but high field grade requirements (e.g., Logistics, Signals, and Intelligence). The accessions plan fills the large combat arms lieutenant requirements, while simultaneously identifying and pre-designating officers to transition to field grade shortage branches with low lieutenant requirements but high field grade requirements.⁴ For example, as far back as 1997 the program allowed the Military Intelligence branch to access, or acquire, close to 400 second lieutenants to active duty, with close to sixty percent serving initially with one of the combat arms or chemical branches.⁵ Today, officers branch detailed to MI attend the MI Officer Advanced Course (OAC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona as their integration course. In addition to professional training schools, senior intelligence leaders have remained engaged throughout the decades in merging skill sets and assimilating these officers into the MI officer culture.

Upon initial implementation into MI, branch detail officers were often referred to as not being "real" intelligence officers and it was not uncommon for an intelligence officer to be asked if they were "homegrown" MI or branch detailed. This relative legitimacy⁶ deficit and stratification within MI was quickly detected and acted upon by MI senior leaders. The MI Branch Detail Outreach Program, an aggressive and successful strategic leadership program, was initiated to provide seamless integration of the branch-detailed officers into the Army intelligence corps. This program encouraged MI leadership to "demonstrate their interest in the professional development and future of our detailed officers."⁷ Senior intelligence officers (SIOs) were given a list of the branch detailed officers in their areas and the proponent Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (CG, USAICS), Fort Huachuca, Arizona encouraged SIOs to contact each branch detailed officer face-to-face in order to mentor and welcome them into the intelligence profession.⁸

Today, branch-detailed MI officers transition into the intelligence corps at approximately their fourth year of service and are widely accepted and integrated into the larger MI Corps.

Officers from other branches with initial Army experiences outside of the intelligence field are now widely accepted as bringing valuable breath and diversity to the corps. Key factors in the successful integration include: strategic leader involvement by the CG,USAICS in issuing compelling, positive guidance to the field; the establishment of formal training and education programs; and the mobilization of SIOs in setting a positive tone by serving as mentors and coaches to both the new, transitioning officers and shaping organizational attitudes and assumptions in the existing basic branch MI officers.⁹ The integration of branch detail officers into MI is a model of success that can be attributed to dedicated senior leader involvement and assimilation into the culture of the Army Intelligence Officer Corps through mentoring and formal training.

As MI tackled assimilating branch detail officers into the corps, it simultaneously sought to develop and refine areas of expertise within the profession; referred to as Areas of Concentration (AOC). Within the officer corps, AOCs have included *collection disciplines* such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as well as developed intelligence *skill sets within echelons*, to include all source intelligence (35D), commonly referred to as tactical intelligence, and strategic intelligence (35B).¹⁰ The 35B/Strategic Intelligence career track was intended to produce a cadre of officers versed in the complexities of joint-strategic-national intelligence support, with officers serving predominantly in this domain. However, during the Cold-War era, 35B's had to return to tactical formations to seek command opportunities in order to remain competitive for promotion. This command requirement defeated the purpose of trying to groom and develop a dedicated cadre of strategic intelligence experts since these officers had to see-saw between tactical and strategic assignments or risk being passed over for promotion.¹¹ Overall, this process did not serve the needs of the Army in best meeting its diverse range of mission requirements, best utilization of unique officer skill sets, nor enable tailoring professional development within both the tactical and strategic arenas without putting one population of officers at risk for future retention. Over time, key catalysts for change emerged with influences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the end of the Cold War, and the organizational changes that were initiated as a result of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI Task Force Study of 1996.

Impact of Joint Requirements & OPMS XXI

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 set the foundation for massive changes in the US military. Of specific relevance to this paper was the Goldwater-Nichols design to improve joint officer management policies and how this impacted the management of the Army's

35B/Strategic Intelligence officers. Most notably, Title IV of the Act, Joint Officer Management, created the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) category. Congress also wrote into law protections to ensure officers that served in joint duty assignments, and were designated as JSO's, would not be penalized from being away from their basic service component (e.g. Air Force, Army, Navy). For example, JSOs within each service are to be promoted at or above the promotion rate compared to those officers whose duties remained within their service component.¹² This important piece of legislation influenced the management of Army MI officers by creating a codified system to enable officers to serve at joint-strategic-national assignments without necessarily jeopardizing their eligibility for promotion. Within Army MI, this new provision helped in the successful management of 35B/Strategic Intelligence officers by mitigating promotion risk for officers that worked primarily in the joint-strategic-national arena and became JSO qualified. While MI continued to emphasize tactical experience in Army formations for its officers, the Goldwater-Nichols Act helped legitimize and provide an opportunity for success outside of the service component's traditional path.

Another opportunity to explore how to enhance the management of the Army intelligence officer corps occurred on the heels of the Goldwater-Nichols Act when then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, declared in June 1996 "it is time to take a holistic view of the OPMS processes and systems as we know them today."¹³ The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI Task was formed, concluding that the existing Army OPMS was structured on legacy, cold-war processes and needed to be overhauled. The existing system required "officers to do too many different things at the field grades to become excellent at any one of them."¹⁴ Additionally, among its many recommendations, the OPMS XXI Task Force highlighted that transformation of the Army Officer Corps was an evolutionary process. This organizational learning process was deemed necessary to develop officers with the right skills, knowledge, and experience to meet unforeseen challenges of the 21st century.¹⁵ In meeting anticipated future requirements, the study made several recommendations to include the formation of new functional areas as well as redefining officer success by creating "greater promotion opportunities for officers *outside the command track*."¹⁶ The command track was a deeply engrained cultural norm for recognizing the Army's top officers. Deviating from this norm and creating new venues for success would require system-wide changes as well as cultural evolution within the force.¹⁷

While pursuing the traditional command track was a well-understood professional norm among the officer corps, the idea of creating a new measure of success within the workforce

was cautiously received. It took emphasis and coaching by General Reimer, to the OPMS XXI Task force, that while warfighting remained the primary skill of the officer corps, that it was also important to develop a contingent of officers specializing in how the Army works as an institution ... to examine focused career paths both in the operational and institutional army, leading to a new definition of *success* for officers outside the traditional command track.¹⁸

When creating specialties outside the traditional command track, the Army championed the message of transformation and building a fighting force capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century while saturating its OPMS XXI initiatives and communiqués with the theme of retaining Army core values. Retaining “a sense of Army tradition and culture... the *muddy boots* culture of the Army and its fighting mission ...”¹⁹ in conjunction with developing a contingent of officers specializing in how the Army works as an institution. At the time, an overarching concern existed amongst senior Army leaders that the *right values* and *warfighting ethos* were fully entrenched in the officer corps prior to launching into functional areas and therefore “any specialization in an officer’s career should not occur until after these formative years, after selection to major”²⁰ in order to ensure the installation of the *right values* and sense of *Army Tradition* and *culture* were fully ingrained and established.²¹

The Army adapted to the recommendations of the Task Force by creating four overarching OPMS XXI career fields (CFs) with subcategories placed under each one. First, the Operations CF (OPCF) was created which was comprised of the 16 basic branches and two functional areas – OPCF focused on employment of land forces and continued traditional command track officer development. The following newly formed CFs developed new models of professional development and success within their specific sub-categories. Second, the Information Operations (IOCF) was comprised of seven newly formed functional areas designed to meet 21st century challenges to gain information dominance. Third, the Institutional Support (ISCF) was formed to focus on the increasingly technical and complex nature of the Army as an institution and lastly the Operational Support (OSCF) was formed with five functional areas (FAs) to strengthen current readiness while building the future force through liaison and acquisition specialties.²² Within the new construct basic branches recognized an opportunity in which they could remain tethered to traditional force management practices while still leaning forward in support of the new FAs to meet anticipated future needs.

It was during this atmosphere of change and innovation that MI leadership seized the initiative and convened the 1996 MI Functional Review board whereby they executed a complete review of Army MI officer structure. Based on Force XXI concepts, senior leaders also examined current and anticipated future MI force requirements. The leaders addressed several

key challenges that plagued effective management of the Army MI officer corps; the central problem of being “unable to fill all MI field grade officer requirements”²³ emerged as a reoccurring issue at all echelons -- tactical, operational and strategic. The Functional Review resulted in the formulation of several strategies to better posture Army MI in meeting mission requirements. Key initiatives included: downgrading select MI billets from O-4/Major to O-3/Captain;²⁴ identifying select MI billets to be recoded and transferred to other newly formed career fields/proponencies;²⁵ deleting AOC 35B/Strategic Intelligence from the active component and creating a new Functional Area (FA) 34/Strategic Intelligence in its place – then recoding maximum echelon above corps²⁶ MI/35 series billets and virtually all AOC 35B to FA34/Strategic Intelligence.²⁷

FA34 was to be placed under the newly formed Information Operations Career Field (IOCF) while basic branch MI (BR35) officers would remain under the traditional command track of Operations Career Field (OPCF). Since officers would compete for promotion within their CF, this split served as a firewall in which the operational-strategic (FA34) and the tactical-operational (BR35) intelligence officers would not compete against each other for promotion.²⁸ It was intended that the CG, USAICS would remain the strategic leader²⁹ for Army intelligence and thus was made the proponent for both FA34 and BR35. The formation of FA34 supplemented the Branch Detail Program in enabling Army intelligence the maximum flexibility to acquire more field grade officers and develop successful career paths within AOCs/FAs in order to establish equilibrium in meeting tactical-operational-strategic commitments.

In January 1997 the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI),³⁰ which is responsible for the personnel arena of the MI proponent, hosted a follow up conference and executed a detailed bottom-up review of all BR35 coded officer billets. This review put into action the strategy outlined by MI senior leaders at the 1996 MI Functional Review Board. Although a tall order, the OMCI team executed a detailed line-by-line review of all Army MI officer billets, expertly staffed follow-up actions, and ultimately served as a key component in reshaping the future Army MI officer corps. They played a large role in ensuring *all three key initiatives* outlined in the 1996 MI Functional Review were executed. Once implemented, a key enabler to streamlining the force was the ability to transfer previously coded BR35 duty positions to newly formed proponents / functional areas under OPMS XXI to include: FA30/Information, FA40/Space, and FA57/Simulation Ops, as well as FA43/Human Resources, and FA50/Force Management.³¹ In addition to these numbers, ultimately 291 MI positions were recoded from 35 series to FA34/Strategic Intelligence.³² By taking these actions, the CG, USAICS was able to streamline, decrease, and reprioritize Army intelligence officer

requirements throughout the force, reshaping the MI officer footprint across all echelons within Army formations as well as within joint organizations.

With the CG, USAICS as the proponent for both FA34 and BR35 the MI Corps could tether itself to the safety of the past while thoughtfully launching into future innovations. The MI Corps could continue to mentor and develop BR35 officers along the traditional command track; while simultaneously supporting OPMS XXI initiatives in meeting joint-strategic-national intelligence mission requirements by creating FA34. The creation of a new MI foundation had been meticulously planned and initiated. MI senior leaders envisioned organizational change that laid the groundwork in enabling a strong and healthy MI officer corps that was responsive, successful, and able to meet mission requirements at every echelon, well into the future. Already successful in assimilating Branch Detail officers into MI, a similar SIO initiative was not instituted to assimilate the FA34 officers. While the genesis and evolution of FA34 was in stark contrast to the Branch Detail Program, they both ultimately served as *key initiatives* in the future readiness and health of the Army Intelligence Officer Corps. Therefore it is important to understand the original premises of why FA34 was created, how it was actually implemented, and how it currently impacts the overall status of today's MI officer corps.

Basic Assumptions and Foundation of FA34

As outlined in the previous section, the 1996 OPMS XXI Task Force and convening of the MI Functional Review board both served as key catalysts in the formation of FA34. However, several other factors influenced the genesis of FA34, to include:³³

- DCSPER directed support to functional areas
- Increase MI Command Opportunity
- Meeting Joint Requirements
- Dedicated AOC while mitigating promotion risk
- Accessions

As part of the initial OPMS XXI initiative, DCSPER directed MI branch to provide approximately 29 -31% of its officers to the OPMS XXI functional area effort. In response to this directed requirement, MI leadership created FA34 which allowed the corps to retain MI experience, exercise oversight over Army intelligence duty positions, and retain the ability to manage the Army intelligence effort across all echelons by serving as the FA34 and BR35 proponenty.³⁴ As anticipated, FA34 attracted a high number of MI officers³⁵ as well as officers from other basic branches. The transfer of some basic branch MI officers to FA34 was desired, by the SIO's at the Functional Review Board, to increase basic branch MI battalion command

opportunity. The increase in battalion command opportunity was based on simple numbers; approximately 24% of MI officers had command opportunity prior to OPMS XXI. With the decrease in the number of basic branch MI officers competing for battalion command a commitment to a correlating increase in overall MI command opportunity was created. This was an important consideration in the late 1990's since under the command-centric, cold war model selection for command was directly correlated to O-6 promotion rates.³⁶

The lessons learned regarding promotion rates and risks in managing the 35B AOC were also taken into account, the creation of FA34 provided an opportunity stabilize expertise by permitting officers to specialize in the joint-strategic-national arena without the promotion risks that had plagued 35B's. Additionally, in the past, MI positions at echelons below corps had been negatively impacted due to the priority to fill legislated joint requirements. To give an indication of the numbers, it was discovered in the 1996 Functional Review that the overall MI field grade fill rate was 64%, with priority of fill going to legislated, joint, echelon above corps positions.³⁷ FA34 would enable dedicated support to legislated joint requirements while "freeing up" basic branch MI officers to dedicate themselves to operational-tactical Army mission requirements. Lastly, the creation of FA34 would serve as another means of officer accessions into MI, thus increasing and enhancing overall Army intelligence support at all echelons. The FA34 program was intended to complement the Branch Detail Program and correct MI's critical shortage of field grade officers. It was a system that was created to allow officers from other Army officer branches to transition into the intelligence field at approximately 10 – 12 years in service.³⁸

MI branch designed and created FA34 in response to ongoing and anticipated mission requirements; it was intended to strengthen and focus the overall Army intelligence effort. However, upon implementation FA34 morphed into something other than what its original founders had envisioned, thus impacting the overall health of the Army MI Officer Corps.

FA34 Implementation

The competitive, specialized nature of FA34 appealed to the values of the Army Officer Corps, and more specifically, to MI officers. Upon its initial inception FA34 drew approximately five-six times the number of applicants that could be accessed, or acquired, into the program. The positive interest can be attributed to the nature of the mission, the effective programs and legacy of integrating branch detail officers, BR35 officers seeking new challenges, and the themes woven in from the greater Army culture as to what the vision of the future FA34 officer cohorts would embody. FA34's were to be officers that were well versed in the *muddy boots*

Army, with strong tactical experience, therefore possessing a strong Army foundation that would enhance their ability to execute assignments in complex, joint-strategic-national intelligence environments. While it was stated up front that FA34's would not command traditional Army formations, alternative success models were communicated. FA34's were to be trained and experienced in order to become future leaders within the complexity of the joint-strategic-national arena to include: J2's at Combatant Commands, Commanders of Joint Intelligence Centers, and strategic leaders responsible for crafting intelligence in support of the nation's most senior military and civilian leaders. The message that the creation of FA34 emerged as an accession mechanism into MI, in order to meet field grade requirements, was either not included in the initial sound-bites that went out to the field³⁹ or became lost in translation. What was clearly communicated to the MI officer population, prior to the first CFD Board in 1998, was that basic branch MI officers who possessed the former 35B AOC were prime candidates for FA34. Additionally, the cohorts would be comprised of a diverse mix of officers from other branches, similar to the Branch Detail Program in support of BR35.

The selection process into FA34 was extremely competitive with nearly half of the selectees already possessing a Master's degree. The first several CFD boards accessed over half of the FA34 officers from the intelligence branch in order to immediately fill mission requirements while simultaneously buying time to train-up officers from other branches.⁴⁰ MI officers that rose to the top of the accessions of the CFD Boards possessed strong tactical experience and had already attended the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP), National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), with most having earned a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree (MSSI).⁴¹ The message that FA34 was an extension of the Army Intelligence Officer Corps was reinforced following the results of the first several CFD boards. For example, YG86 was the first year group cohort to compete for LTC under the OPMS XXI system and went before the CFD board in FY99 with over half of the 16 officers accessed into FA34 coming from basic MI branch, with most of those MI officers possessing the former 35B as an alternate AOC. The rest of the officers accessed into FA34 came from branches across the force, predominantly combat arms. This accessions pattern continued through YG92.⁴²

Officers coming into FA34 immediately attended training for 12-weeks in the Strategic Intelligence Officers Course (SIOC), Fort Huachuca. The course was originally designed to prepare "both non-MI and MI officers for the PGIP and follow-on assignments by concentrating on analytical skills and operational intelligence."⁴³ Because priority fills went to non-MI officers most basic branch MI officers selected for FA34 did not attend the SIOC training. The SIOC

course was later reduced to a seven week training program and by 2003 it was not required for basic branch MI officers, however, it remained a requirement for all non-MI officers transitioning into FA34.⁴⁴ As part of branch qualification, FA34's also were trained at the 40 week PGIP at the NDIC, DIA.⁴⁵ Throughout Force XXI upheaval and transition, the small initial FA34 cohort groups were characterized by a sense of unity and optimism. Internally, Army leadership along with the newly established systemic processes gave the officers an alternate, albeit unconventional, path for success in the Army. Additionally, a sense of cohesion and shared experiences⁴⁶ existed with CG, USAICS as the proponent for both FA34 and BR35. This combined with the small community of MI officers combined with the inclusion of predominantly combat arms officers into FA34, in which many knew one another from previous assignments and training experiences.

The sense of unity and identity within FA34 shifted in 2002 when CG, USAICS issued guidance to be incorporated into the CFD Board that no MI officers were to be released from the basic branch to serve in functional areas.⁴⁷ Retention and stabilization of the existing MI officer population influenced the proponent decision, especially in light of the ongoing global war on terrorism requirements. For example, in 2001, indications of potential instability within MI were already visible when one of the results of the 2001 CFD Board revealed that all MI officers requesting to remain in BR35/OPCF were retained by MI; however only 50% of those officers that comprised the MI Corps had requested to remain in MI as a first choice.⁴⁸ Additionally, in 2001 MI faced attrition rates higher than the Army average and in 2006 had the largest officer attrition in the Army.⁴⁹ In 2002 stop loss was initiated; basic branch MI was working hard to stabilize the force and fill its field grade requirement commitments in both the Army formations and in legislated joint requirements. With the new guidance to the 2002 CFD Board the "face" of FA34 also underwent substantial change.

From 2002 to present, FA34 accessions has predominantly drawn officers from combat arms, changing the once diverse face of the FA34 officer cadre to one of mostly white males. To date, zero female officers have been accessed into FA34 from the past seven CFD Boards (YG93-YG99).⁵⁰ From a purely accessions stand-point limiting BR35 officers from going into FA's was logical since the program was intended to add to the personnel pool of Army intelligence, not draw from it. However, this new guidance contradicted and negated one of the start-up goals of creating FA34 which would pull out the former 35B AOC officers from the basic branch in order to increase BR35 command opportunity, thereby ultimately increasing MI promotion rates in both AOCs. The proponent could have issued guidance that allowed a limited number of MI officers to compete and be selected for FA34 in order to fully develop its

strategic intelligence AOC and use as a retention initiative. This initiative would allow officers to cast a vote in the nature and shaping of their future service, keep intelligence experience intact within the proponent, and could potentially result in better officer retention rates in MI.

Despite the fact that BR35 officers are “locked-into” MI and not being released to other functional areas they have not been dissuaded from trying to go into FAs. BR35 officers continue to dominate the number of requests to go into FA34, with double the number of requests than from other basic branches. For example, in the CFD Board for 2005/YG96 there was a total of 263 officer requests to go into FA34. Ultimately, 11 officers were selected for FA34 with 39 *first choice* requests from BR35 (none approved) and 26 first choice requests from officers from other branches.⁵¹ Despite guidance that had been in place for several years, BR35 officers have continued to request FA34 in good numbers at the CFD Boards.

By changing the rules and closing-off FA34 to experienced MI officers, the internal organizational culture experienced strained cohesion, integration, and degradation of the professional intelligence culture that had initially given FA34 its jump-start. Following 2001, many BR35 officers did not consider FA34 officers as intelligence professionals because the officers that comprised FA34 had ten or more years in service with many having little intelligence training and virtually no intelligence experience. These newly minted strategic intelligence officers were launched into mostly joint, complex, fast-paced environments while still trying to get their bearings – learning basic intelligence terminology, analysis, writing skills, and dealing with high visibility requirements such as briefing senior officers and producing quality intelligence products. BR35 and FA34 officers are both mixed and present at echelon above corps organizations, such as at the theater-operational Combatant Commands and joint assignments at DIA. The gap in experience and professional expertise strained cohesion and a common language amongst the FA34’s and across MI, not only due to internal factors but also due to external influences.

Externally Army MI delivered inconsistent support to joint organizations. Commanders and senior intelligence officers within joint organizations were expected by MI to be patient in letting the Army deliver to them some field grade officers with little knowledge and experience in the intelligence tradecraft. Prior to 2002, a small cadre of FA34’s did not have any intelligence developmental assignments or experience in an Army intelligence mission prior to serving in support of national-strategic, real-world missions; they were the exception. After 2002 almost all of the officers accessed into FA34 had little to no experience in the intelligence profession and by 2006 it was common amongst BR35 officers to generalize and characterize FA34’s as being intelligence officers by training only and not by experience. These officers were placed in real-

world complex environments where as field grades they were expected to be able to take the lead. Commanders and J2's just wanted good, reliable, actionable intelligence support from the Army. One perceived method to get this basic intelligence support from the Army was to ask for support that had worked in the past, without understanding the accessions goals of MI, national and joint commands gradually reverted billets from FA34 back to BR35. The Army MI strategic plan and vision set into motion close to a decade earlier was starting to unravel.

The internal and external factors morphed the MI footprint so that by 2006, FA34 had been *cut in half* from its initial size of 298 field-grade billets in 1998 to 152 billets in 2006 through the *progressive recoding* of billets to BR35.⁵² Perhaps coincidentally, the first FA34 billets to disappear and be converted back to BR35 were from Fort Huachuca and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the two most powerful intelligence organizations within the Army. By accident or intention this prevented newly accessed branch transfer, FA34 intelligence officers from being mentored and assimilated into the greater Army intelligence culture by not giving them an Army intelligence developmental assignment opportunity or exposure to Army SIO mentoring. This development also shut-out the MI officers that had transitioned into FA34 from inclusion in the greater Army intelligence organizations, networks, and initiatives.

Additionally, SIO bias and uninformed assumptions prevented FA34 billets from being created in many other organizations,⁵³ to include one of the nation's largest, joint, interagency intelligence organizations – the National Security Agency. By preventing or just not creating FA34 positions at the home of MI, USAICS, the Army G2, and representation of some measure within Army Elements at strategic-national intelligence organizations hampered the legitimacy and acceptance of FA34 into the greater MI community –and therefore ultimately degraded overall MI efforts to meet manning and mission requirements across the force. Army MI came up with the FA34 solution and at the same time the overall force was apathetic, resistant or ill-informed on the purpose and strategic vision. Without strategic leader initiative and an articulated vision to integrate, train and mentor FA34's seamlessly into the greater Army intelligence community, transformational change experienced inertia.

In general, Army intelligence leaders did not seem to understand that every billet recoded back to BR35 hurt the overall MI officer end-strength and ability across the force to meet optimal manning and thus mission support potential. The manning priorities of the Army currently dictate that BR35 officers will support the Army tactical formations first to support the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).⁵⁴ Most theater and strategic level organizations are a lower priority fill for the Army. However, since FA34s do not serve in tactical formations,

operational-strategic organizations do not need to compete with Army tactical requirements to get Army intelligence support in the form of FA34s. While a mix of FA34/BR35 officers exist at operational-theater and strategic organizations, predominantly BR35 officers are apportioned to Army tactical-operational formations. However, legislated joint positions must be filled, and since there are not enough FA34 officers in the inventory and the billets have gradually been taken off the books, BR35 officers must then be utilized to fill these positions. It should be remembered that FA34's serve in the former 35B positions and are intended to meet MI requirements at joint-strategic-national organizations while still remaining competitive for retention and further promotion within the new Army system. MI should invest in FA34 cadre the same way it has invested in BR35, establish a hybrid mix of branch transfer officers and basic branch MI officers. A hybrid mix within FA34 will reinforce that the functional area is Army intelligence by another name, since FA34 is the 21st century answer to the former 35B AOC.⁵⁵ The slow recoding of billets that were once BR35, then transitioned to FA34, and recently recoded to back to BR35 has resulted in an overall increased demand on BR35/MI due to lower FA34 accessions, see figure 1.

Increased Demand on MI




Figure 1. Depicts Increased Demand on Basic Branch 35/MI due to loss of FA34 positions.⁵⁶

For example, if INSCOM -- which is an echelon-above-corps formation -- would recode its analytical billets back to FA34 it would drive the accessions for strategic intelligence officers up and INSCOM would ultimately get those field grade billets filled. As it stands, INSCOM's highest priority units get priority fill so out of 250 field grade billets INSCOM can only get 180 filled.⁵⁷ Since INSCOM converted its FA34 billets back to BR35 field grade positions, with the intent of getting more BR35 intelligence officer fills, they did not understand that they cannot draw from an officer pool that just does not exist -- MI BR35 accessions are driven by *company grade* requirements and FA34 and Branch Detail accessions are driven by *field grade* requirements. Overall, in 2006 MI was required to fill approximately 148 former FA34 billets, leaving MI short of approximately 150 field grades.⁵⁸ The overall impact on MI was not fully understood by OMCI or SIOs in the field as they viewed billet recoding as just as an isolated FA34 issue, rather than an intricate part of the overall health and strategic roadmap in successfully bringing the Army MI Officer Corps into the 21st Century.

In addition to the proponent failing to manage FA34 billets, it also failed to clearly define the mission, skills, and tasks unique to officers serving predominantly in support of joint-strategic-national missions. Amongst the seasoned FA34's, concern grew regarding the legitimacy and professionalism of the FA34 cadre. Without active proponent involvement, the vision and tenacity of the Army's senior FA34 put into action a series of initiatives to remedy the growing discord. Throughout 2005-2006, the leaders that were now coming up through the ranks in FA34 organized a series of communiqués across the force, resulting in a FA34 workshop held 27 February – 3 March 2006. The D.C. workshop sought to define and codify the FA34 core mission, primary tasks, and training standards.⁵⁹ The forum resulted in a developed consensus on FA34's purpose, unique functions, mission and vision. The group further defined FA34 goals, mapped out a proposed career path, identified legitimate FA34 jobs and their descriptions, education, training, and drafted a Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The workshop products and recommendations were sent out via e-mail world-wide to FA34s encouraging inputs and feedback on the results of the workshop. Upon compiling inputs from the FA34 community, the results were then forwarded to OMCI, as the proponent. The role of OMCI was to formally review, validate and then staff recommendations into appropriate venues. It was during this phase of coordination that OMCI and the MI representative at the Army G-1 resisted or just plain ignored the issues submitted regarding FA34 evolution.⁶⁰ In response to the bureaucracy, the Army's senior FA34 officer crafted and disseminated an e-mail to several MI General Officers, to include the CG, USAICs, the Army G2, INSCOM Commander and J2, DIA as well as to senior field grade officers within FA34 and BR35.

The e-mail was sent out on 14 August 2006, causing controversy and a stir within the intelligence ranks. This communiqué catapulted the long ignored issues by the proponent that senior FA34 officers had been wrestling with. This marked the first time the issue of billets and FA34 concerns were brought to the attention of MI senior leaders.⁶¹ In September 2006 the CG, USAICs and the Army G2 were briefed for the first time on the status of FA34. It was revealed that neither senior MI leader knew much about FA34; to include the reasons behind the genesis of FA34 nor were they versed in why FA34 mattered to the overall, long-term health of Army intelligence. By October 2006, on behalf of the CG, USAICS, the OMCI staff issued the necessary proponent guidance for units to review their manning documents and Army officer requirements.⁶² Since the majority of the FA34's existed in joint units, the message went out to all Combatant Command J2 staffs, select national intelligence community organizations, and relevant Army formations. The OMCI message included helpful information to addressees on what Army MI billet review requirements were and solicited their support to meet billet conversion goals. However, the message also included a contentious paragraph in which the OMCI staff sought to define the similarities and differences between Army BR35 and FA34 officers. It was in this paragraph that the rift in the Army's MI officer sub-culture was clearly captured. The "haves" and "have nots"⁶³ in MI was no longer just an intangible, organizational consensus⁶⁴ but was now put in print outside of the Army MI community to joint commands world-wide. In part the message read,

... AOC 35 is an MI officer who will serve in repetitive assignments at all echelons. He is trained to conduct intelligence operations, serve in S2/G2 positions and will compete for CSL command or G2. As MI captains career course graduate, with the possibility of holding and an additional MI AOC, he is an MI Pentathlete in the truest sense of the word. An FA34 is trained as a strategic and regional intelligence specialist who may have come from outside of MI but who normally will have completed DIA's Post Graduate Intelligence Program or have been granted equivalent credit. This officer will not compete for CSL command or G2 but will work repetitive assignments at theater, joint, and strategic levels as an analyst or intelligence supervisor ...⁶⁵

The evolving internal split amongst officers within Army intelligence was made clear and codified in the message text, the proponent described BR35 officers as being the consummate intelligence officer while the FA34's were described as being something less than that. Army culture undertones emerged that clearly separated BR35 and FA34's, that while officers in FA34 may possess unique enabling skills they were not *necessarily* dedicated warfighters or intelligence professionals. Such officers were perceived as somehow shying away from the long understood test of leadership embodied in the command track, and that there existed a fundamental difference in values that motivated an officer to remain in the traditional BR35 vice

going into one of the new functional areas. Additionally, the dynamics regarding the lack of any basic branch intelligence officers in the FA34 population following 2002, as well as the tension that emerged with so many BR35 officers requesting FA34 without being able to get accessed into the FA, created a rift in the officer corps where the BR35 officers asserted their legitimacy, creating an “in-group” of BR35’s and an “out-group”⁶⁶ of FA34’s. The conditions for this organizational dynamic were in place, of note none of the FA34 duty positions were recognized as being Key Billets and FA34’s were isolated from MI strategic leaders in both the proponent and Army G2.

While the message met the required task of officially having units review their billet codes, so the Army G-1 could work manning actions, it unofficially served as further propagating divisions within the Army intelligence organizational culture and legitimacy issues that emerged for close to a decade between BR35’s and FA34’s. In addition to inaction by OMCI in following through with the initiatives outlined in 1996, it could now be looked at in 2006 as a catalyst for division vice unification within the MI proponent. The MI Corps was to face external influences that would continue to challenge management of its officer corps.

Where we are in 2007 – Evolution of OPMS

On September 5, 2006, the Army announced a revision to the OPMS system by functionally realigning the OPMS design. As a result the previous officer framework was made obsolete and was replaced by three Functional Categories: Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE); Operations Support; and Force Sustainment. The Functional Categories “are further divided into Functional Groups that link branches and functional areas with similar battle field functions.”⁶⁷ The revised OPMS design is touted as “... better aligned to the critical joint functions required of the Army than the four Career Fields of OPMS 3 and provides broader officer development.”⁶⁸ For Army intelligence FA34 and BR35 officers are now both placed under the Functional Category of Operations Support (OS). They are placed together under the Functional Group of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) & Area Expertise, along with Foreign Area Officers / FA48.⁶⁹ CG, USAICS remains the proponent for FA34 and BR35 and the Army G3 continues to be the proponent for FA48.⁷⁰

Additional changes were implemented, to include FA34’s now are aligned within the MI Corps at their seventh year of service, vice 10 years, allowing for earlier integration and utilization. Also, implementation of “code or position sharing” within the three new ISR categories was directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army. His intent was to broaden officer professional development and to have greater flexibility in assigning the right officer to the right

job. The impact on officers in ISR categories is that approximately 20% of all BR35, FA34, and FA48 positions will be identified for code sharing. Promotions will continue to be based on requirements identified within a given branch or functional area.⁷¹ The new model opens up opportunities for greater flexibility in managing intelligence support, integrating officers from other branches earlier into the intelligence profession, and unifying the overall intelligence effort. The OPMS updates are intended to “better position the Officer Corps to meet current and future operational requirements in light of Modularity and Army Transformation.”⁷²

With the abolishment of MI commands at Corps and below in 2003 and again with the current 2006 OPMS Functional Category alignment, MI basic branch is in a state of transition. It has had to re-look organizational values, assumptions, and professional development models to remain relevant and competitive in the new operating environment. Some MI officers strongly hold onto the command centric model and believe that as a member of the former OPCF, MI should be realigned under the new structure with MFE vice the OS. Others believe the new ISR category is a positive step in the right direction and will ultimately provide better intelligence support at all echelons. Under the new paradigm many BR35 officers do not see themselves as OS but rather under the traditional, pre-dominantly command track category of MFE. The legacy, cold-war assumption that the best and brightest officers are kept in BR35 to become future leaders and commanders is a mental model that dominates the basic branch. In general, to be grouped with FA34 and FA48 has not been fully accepted by BR35 as they continue to pursue previous models of success and define legitimacy between the “haves and have nots,” as displayed in the September 2006 OMCI message.

Remaining on the command track continues to be coveted and serves as a central discriminator amongst BR35 officers, and many SIOs. Today, Army intelligence is investing in “buying back” intelligence battalions that will be placed in organizational tables at echelons-above-corps but serve as modular “plug-n-play” support for tactical division and brigade combat teams. It is an innovative concept intended to provide flexible, tailored intelligence support to an expeditionary force. These MI battalion and brigade formations are modeled on the command structures of the past. It remains to be seen if these formations are the best way to meet current and future Army intelligence needs. A real challenge exists for MI to balance how it transforms, how much of the past to hold onto and how much of an unknown future to invest in.

Strengthening MI into the Future / Recommendations

Assuming that Army MI will continue to require accessions at the field grade level, and will utilize the Branch Detail Program and FA34 CF programs to meet its requirements, then the

following recommendations are made to enhance the overall health of the MI officer corps. The recommendations are not all inclusive or complete in their prescription, but rather highlight key issues in order to initiate the dialogue and openly acknowledge the unique challenges in establishing and maintaining a cohesive Army intelligence professional identity, culture and sense of legitimacy while simultaneously supporting mission requirements and Army Transformation. While the recommendations⁷³ appear in a linear manner, none of them are stand-alone and most need to be executed simultaneously to achieve positive change.

- *A compelling positive vision reinforced by MI strategic leader action.* A vision outlining the merits of diversity amongst MI officer professionals as an inter-dependent united team must be articulated by senior, strategic leaders within the Army intelligence community; specifically by the CG, USAICS and the Army G2. An understanding of why AOCs exist and the unique interdependent contributions MI professionals make at each echelon should be pursued. The officer corps must believe that the organization will be better off in leveraging the complementary differences in BR35 AOCs, and integration of branch transfer officers within BR35 and FA34. Dialogue with and “buy-in” from the SIOs out in the field is imperative to foster teamwork, and this consensus must be bridged and reinforced amongst intelligence officers across the force. Establish mentoring programs similar to the successful Branch Detail Outreach Program that welcomes and recognizes the collective contributions made by basic branch, branch transfer, and FA34 officers. Communicate and reinforce that intelligence skill sets and legitimacy is valued across the proponent, that we are interdependent. Shatter old mental models of inclusion and exclusion; for example include leader representation from all accessions venues in proponent Roadmap Forums, Initiative Working Groups, Key Social Gatherings, MI Leadership Forums and within Intelligence Agencies. Educate the force, legitimize the split-jurisdictions within Army intelligence and reinforce that we all on the same team.
- *Fix the Force Structure.* Dedicated oversight by the CG, USAICS is required to track, implement and sustain the “right” hybrid mix of both branch detail and basic branch officers within BR35 and FA34. Additionally, conduct another review board with SIOs from BR35 and FA34 to deliberately execute billet coding mix across all echelons. Proactive OMCI and SIOs involvement and deliberate oversight are critical components in ensuring the proper leader and staff actions are taken to implement change that will endure throughout Army formations and joint organizations. While recoding billets to FA34 is a necessary near-term step, the change will only be

institutionalized in the long-term when key internal and external issues are addressed. Internally Army SIOs must understand the “whys” behind the creation of the Branch Detail Program and FA34 career Field. That the strategic intelligence / FA34 officers belong to the legacy AOC 35B by another name. Inclusion and a balanced mix of basic branch officers and branch transfer officers should be pursued within FA34. Additionally, SIOs need to get involved in ensuring these officers are properly trained, educated and mentored. Externally, if the mentoring and training of the strategic intelligence AOC is successful, then FA34 officers should become the Army MI officer of choice at joint-national-strategic organizations. If FA34’s deliver inconsistent or substandard support, then it reflects on the overall Army MI profession, and will result in little incentive for these organizations to continue to keep FA34 billets within their manning documents. Recoding should be a win-win for both the Army and for DoD organizations outside the Army.

- *Revisit FA34 Accessions Criteria.* A re-look of the CFD Board guidelines and accessions process is long overdue. Unintended second and third order effects have emerged such as the loss of diversity in the backgrounds and experience of branch transfer officers, the gradual elimination of gender and minority representation, and the loss of a balanced hybrid mix of basic branch intelligence officers along with branch transfer officers. The hybrid mix that exists within BR35 should also exist within FA34.
- *Formal Training.* Review, update, and incorporate separate but equally valued training and education programs for all the intelligence AOCs. These models exist within MI for All Source Intelligence (35D), Human Intelligence (35F) and Signals Intelligence (35G). The training model, along with proponent involvement, needs to be expanded for Strategic Intelligence (FA34). Since FA34 and BR35 work within a shared jurisdiction,⁷⁴ a settled division of labor needs to be codified. The proponent should take the lead in reviewing and clearly outlining the unique skill sets needed to foster expert skill sets within FA34 that are different from BR35. The ground work has already been laid with existing UJTLs for BR35 and the drafting of a FA34 UJTL from August 2005. Formally codify and institute training unique to each AOC. Specifically, incorporate seasoned FA34’s into the SIOC training in both curriculum formulation as well as experience and background in teaching from the podium. Instructors will become the first mentors and leaders to officers coming in from other branches or into the strategic intelligence community. Foster a respect and appreciation for the

intelligence work being done at each echelon. Deliberately incorporate into proponent sound-bites to the force and into training curriculums how each unique echelon that MI officers operate in complements mission support. Intelligence support and cooperation shared amongst echelons can be leveraged globally to provide timely, relevant, actionable intelligence from the most tactical to strategic realm. A seamless, integrated global intelligence network within Army formations, joint warfighting and strategic organizations will enhance intelligence support across the force.

- *Form Informal Training of Relevant “Family” Groups and Teams.* Army intelligence officers should not feel like deviants if they break from the traditional path and pursue new, visionary models of success. Because cultural norms are embedded in groups, informal training and practice must be provided throughout the MI Corps so that new norms and new assumptions can be jointly formed. This applies to both BR35 and FA34s as they refine and adapt their AOCs to provide the best intelligence support to unforeseen future formations and missions.
- *Create Practice Fields, Fix Integration of New Officers & Developmental Assignments.* If the formal learning in each AOC is to take hold, then intelligence officers must have a sense that they can manage their own informal training processes, practice, and have an opportunity to learn by experience without being penalized. Just as SIO dedicated effort has gone into assimilating branch detail officers, the same thoughtful integration needs to be applied to FA34s. Currently, it is informally accepted by FA34 leaders that DIA serves as the “training ground” for new strategic intelligence officers since the DIA J2 has established a positive learning environment and has taken an active role in the integration and training of the joint military and civilian workforce. The idea to integrate FA34s back into Army formations to develop strategic intelligence officers should be carefully reviewed and thoughtfully road mapped. It would be a counterproductive initiative unless the issues regarding legitimacy and acceptance within Army MI culture is addressed. Ultimately seamless integration of FA34 and BR35 officers at USAICs, the Army G2, and INSCOM would give senior company grade and junior field grade officers the right developmental experience and mentoring to expose officers in both AOCs to Army MI culture.
- *Create A Reward and Discipline System – Consistent with the New Way.* Establish and issue guidance for Key Billets within the FA34 and BR35 domains. BR35 adapted rapidly to the elimination of MI Battalion Commands by creating G2 staff positions as Key Billets to legitimize intelligence contributions and to identify duties to distinguish

officers' potential for future advancement. Likewise, a limited number of Key Billets should be established for FA34 officers in the most critical, strategic-national duties. This will visibly create separate, distinct valued career paths within the split-jurisdiction of Army MI and ultimately have officers value the leadership and contributions of their peers at different echelons.

Conclusions

Successful transformational change within the Army Intelligence Officer Corps is within reach. With Army-wide transformation and the global war on terrorism commanding immediate attention it is easy to put aside the challenges facing the MI Officer Corps. However, the heart of MI is the quality of people serving throughout the Corps. Attention to the human dimension is critical in synchronizing and bringing together the Officer Corps within AOCs and across every echelon. SIO vision and mentoring of the officer cadre is an important investment and force multiplier that deserves dedicated, deliberate oversight. In this new era, leaders and legitimacy in the intelligence tradecraft comes in many forms – it is time for our strategic leaders to form and enact a vision that will serve as a central node to the dispersed, diverse, global Army Intelligence Officer Corps to leverage our collective capabilities. The diverse nature of Army MI should be harnessed as a strength -- serve as a unifying element, enhance teamwork, adaptability, and innovation to meet unforeseen challenges as we develop intelligence professionals who are competent at all echelons in support of tactical, joint and expeditionary requirements. By building a new, global sense of community amongst our nations military intelligence professionals we will be united and better prepared to meet the 21st century security environment.

Endnotes

¹ For low density branches this is historically a larger Army wide problem. For a quick overview and primer see the sections "The Impact of the Discrepancy Between Officer Inventory and Authorizations" and "Skill Mismatches by Grade at the Field Grade Level" in *OPMS XXI: Final Report: Prepared for the Chief of Staff, Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 09 July 1997), 4-6 thru 4-10. Additionally, for MI specifically institutional insights were invaluable from Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, telephone interview by author, 12 February 2007.

² Different areas of concentration, AOCs, have been formed within MI to create an officer cadre that has unique skill sets within collection disciplines (35C, 35E, 35F, 35G) and echelons (35B, 35D). See United States, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3-35: Branch Code 35: Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 01 August 1987), 1-4. Legacy MI Branch Codes follow. MI Branch Code 35 included 6 areas of concentration (AOCs) in which

officers were trained, and several specific skills. Areas of Concentrations included: BRANCH 35 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: *35A GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, 35B STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE (RC); 35C IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT); 35D TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE; 35E COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI); 35F HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT); 35G SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE (SIGINT/EW). *35A is used to designate branch immaterial positions which any MI officer may be assigned. Today, in 2007, upon entry all basic branch MI officers are initially given the AOC 35D (Tactical Intelligence) Officers. Following the Officer Advanced Course select officers can further specialize in 35C, 35E, 35F, or 35G. Note that the 35B designator no longer exists and since 1997 has been replaced with Functional Area 34/Strategic Intelligence. And Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, OMCI, telephone interview by author, 12 Feb 2007.

³ The FAP was a relatively short lived Army personnel system that was quickly adjusted and replaced by the Branch Detail Program. Public literature on the historical FAP program is scarce. Most of the provided data is from the author's observations and experiences while serving in the US Army as well as in discussions with Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, telephone interview by author, 12 February 2007. Ms Borghardt has served with the OMCI since 1985 and prior to that served 20 years on active military duty in MI.

⁴ U.S. Headquarters Department of the Army, *Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers*, Army Regulation 614-100 (Washington, DC: 10 January 2006), 5 and for historical background on the challenges being faced with officer inventory that lead to a mechanism for cross-leveling officers in *OPMS XXI: Final Report: Prepared for the Chief of Staff, Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 09 July 1997), 4-7 thru 4-10.

⁵ LTC George K. Gramer, Jr, "Proponent Notes," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 23 (April-June 1997): 1.

⁶ Richard Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews and project director Don M. Snider (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 215.

⁷ Gramer, 1.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 332-333. Schein outlines conditions that must be established to have successful transformational change in an organization. Creating psychological safety for organizational members is the challenge change leaders must implement. While only 4 of the 8 steps are highlighted in the paper, the key point is Army MI executed the key actions necessary for long term success in the integration and transformation of the MI officer corps assimilation of branch detail officers. This model is used later in the paper for framing recommendations.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3-35: Branch Code 35: Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 01 August 1987), 1-4. MI Branch Code 35 included 6 areas of concentration (AOCs) in which officers were trained in and identified by earning a specific skill identifier. Legacy MI Branch Codes, or Areas of Concentrations, included: BRANCH 35 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: *35A GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, 35B STRATEGIC

INTELLIGENCE (RC); 35C IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT); 35D TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE; 35E COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI); 35F HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT); 35G SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE (SIGINT/EW). *35A is used to designate branch immaterial positions which any MI officer may be assigned. Note that the 35B designator no longer exists and since 1997 has been replaced with Functional Area 34/Strategic Intelligence. Also note that in 1987 the 35D designation was used to identify the specialty code Tactical Intelligence. Today in 2007, 35D designation has been updated to reflect the specialty code All-Source Intelligence. As of 2007, all basic branch MI officers are designated 35D (All Source Intelligence) Officers upon initial entry. Following the Officer Advanced Course select officers can further specialize in 35C, 35E, 35F, or 35G.

¹¹ Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, telephone interview by author, 12 February 2007 (hereafter cited as Borghardt interview).

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *Instruction Number 1300.20, DoD Joint Officer Management Program Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: 20 December 1996) 32. And U.S. Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 1330.02C*, (Washington, D.C.: 24 February 2006) A3-A5. And U.S. Department of Defense, *Instruction Number 1300.20, DoD Joint Officer Management Program Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: 20 December 1996) 32.

¹³ *OPMS XXI: Final Report: Prepared for the Chief of Staff, Army*, 1-1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* There were many recommendations made from the OPMS XXI Task Force. The quote reflects a bottom-line-up-front assessment presented in the Executive Summary, Introduction of the final OPMS XXI report.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, iii, 1-2 thru 1-3, 3-1 thru 4-4, 5-1 thru 5-6. Also see, Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 349-351; reference the term *learning organizations* used throughout the OPMS XXI Final Report.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, iv, 4-17.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-5, 5-1 thru 5-2. The Report references a number of surveys amongst the officer corps where they very clearly communicated that the “command track” is the only viable and credible path for promotion.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xviii. The concept of developing and retaining warfighting, tactical experience is emphasized throughout the report, the executive summary provides the best role up under the “Leader Concerns” section, pg xvii thru xviii. Additionally, Officership and Officer Values are discussed in pages 3-2 thru 3-5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vii-viii. The theme is emphasized again in “Values and Character” section, 3-4, 5-5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, v and 3-1 thru 3-8; 4-1 thru 4-4. The italicized words are those used in the text of the report as they emphasized over and over the importance of Army Values, culture, and tradition.

²² Ibid., xiii, 5-2 thru 5-5. For details on each CF see above reference. The newly formed career fields are included as a reference and example of OPMS changes within the Army that justified the basis for the formation of FA34.

²³ CPT Duane A. Dannewitz, "Proponent Notes: MI Officer Structure Task Force," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 23 (April – June 1997): 1-2. This review occurred at the 1996 MI Functional Review for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) in which MI leadership executed a complete review of MI officer structure and requirements.

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Army U.S Total Army Personnel Command, "SUBJECT: Notification of Future Change to DA Pam 611-21 vice AR 611-101, 0-9810-3, Revision of Branch 35 (Military Intelligence)," memorandum, Alexandria, VA, 15 July 1998. In January 1997 Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) hosted a follow up conference to execute a detailed bottom up review of all MI Branch 35 coded officer billets. This document is one of the results of the line-by-line review of Army MI officer requirement across the force, both in Army and joint organizations.

²⁵ MAJ Brian Dunmire, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, "Military Intelligence Corps: FA34 Laydown," briefing slides, Alexandria, Virginia, 22 September 2006.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001, As Amended Through 01 March 2007), 173. The term echelon is used in the sense of a "separate level of Command" in accordance with JP 1-02. Tailored skill sets and intelligence support is often referred to within the military as being at echelons below corps (EBC) (the tactical-operational environment; for example, Army formations such as platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps) and echelon above corps (the operational-strategic-joint environment; for example, Army Corps formations, theater, combatant command, joint strategic-national organizations). For further information on EBC and EAC see U.S. Department of the Army, *Intelligence*, Field Manual No. 2-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 May 2004).

²⁷ "Proponent Notes, Officer," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (April-June 1999), 3. And Dunmire, "Military Intelligence Corps: FA34 Laydown."

²⁸ *What Is OPMS XXI? And Other Frequently Asked Questions: An Officer's Guide to the Officer Personnel Management System for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, 1997), 12. Officers competed for promotion under their CF affiliation.

²⁹ COL Stephen A. Shamback, ed, *Strategic Leadership Primer: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management United States Army War College*, 2d ed. (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 2004), Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. This product is a good, concise reference that addresses the complexities and scope of what senior leaders – strategic leaders - must contend with. Key quotes relevant to this papers focus: "*Strategic leaders must be experts in their domain and in the bureaucratic and political environment of the decision making process ...*", 6. And "This environment consists of both external and internal complexities that directly and indirectly affect the resourcing, structuring, and operational performance of an organization," 14.

³⁰ For more information on OMCI, see LTC Harvey L. Crockett, "Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 30 (April – June 2004), 9.

³¹ U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, OPMS Task Force, "Military Intelligence Recoding Brief," briefing slides, 8 October 1997, 1-5. And "Notification of Future Change to DA Pam 611-21 vice AR 611-101, 0-9810-3, Revision of Branch 35 (Military Intelligence)."

³² Dunmire, "Military Intelligence Corps: FA34 Laydown."

³³ Dani Di Ciccio-Harbaugh, HRC, e-mail message to Tony Kanellis, 5 February 2001.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ John M. Custer, LTC, "The Impact of OPMS XXI on MI Officers," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 23 (October-December 1997): 29. High interest in FA34 continues, Major Brian Dunmire, Human Resources Command, interview by author, 09 November 2006.

³⁶ Ciccio-Harbaugh.

³⁷ A good, succinct lay-out of the background and development of FA34 can be found in the power point presentation by Dunmire, "Military Intelligence Corps: FA34 Laydown." This presentation was e-mailed from Major Brian Dunmire, 03 October 2006 to FA34s Army Wide.

³⁸ *OPMS XXI: Final Report*, 5-5. And a short, concise summary of the anticipated impact on MI can be found in Custer, 29.

³⁹ By "the field" I am referring to the series of information briefs the U.S Army Total Personnel Command executed at Army installations CONUS and OCONUS to explain to the officer corps the new program. The Army established a 24/7 website which housed comprehensive briefings, a frequently asked questions section, and distributed a hardcopy of *What is OPMS XXI?*, 1, 26.

⁴⁰ MAJ Brian Dunmire, US. Army Human Resources Command, interview by author, 09 November 2006 (hereafter cited as Dunmire interview). And Borghardt interview. And Dunmire, "Military Intelligence Corps: FA34 Laydown."

⁴¹ Borghardt, interview. The intent was to front-load 35B MI officers that had already completed PGIP into the first few year groups going into FA34, this allowed for immediate placement of qualified officers into FA34 jobs while the non-MI officers selected for FA34 went through training and education during their first year of being accessed into the program (SIOC and PGIP). Note the NDIC was given its new name in December 2006. The DIA college was previously referred to as the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) and prior to that was named the Defense Intelligence College (DIC).

⁴² *What Is OPMS XXI?*, 19-24. The guide explains cohort YG timelines in transitioning to OPMS XXI. And Major Brian Dunmire, HRC, "FA34: Purpose, Impact, and Challenges," powerpoint briefing slides, Alexandria, VA, 14 November 2006, 7. This paper focuses on YG86 forward due to the fact that they are the first year group to be promoted to LTC under the new system. The officers in YG80 were similar to YG86 in that they went before a CFD board in FY99 which was just prior to their colonel promotion board in FY01; for YG80 FA34 accessed a

total of 4 officers all of which were former MI/35B officers. Each officer population from YG80-YG86 had different timelines & guidelines for CFD as the system incrementally worked its way into the implementation. It was not uncommon for MI officers that had been passed over for BN Command to then seek designation in a FA. Also, officers in YGs prior to 1980 were not formally boarded and could apply for a FA on a case-by-case basis.

⁴³ MAJ Richard C. Hoehne, "Strategic Intelligence Officers Course," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 25 (April-June 1999), 37. This article lays out the original training topics and objectives of the SIOC. And Major Brian Dunmire, "FA34 Information Brief," briefing slides, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 31 October 2006, 4.

⁴⁴ Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, "Officer Actions," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 30 (January-March 2004), 70-71. And U.S. Army Human Resources Command, FA34 Homepage, "FA34 Career Manager's Update," available from <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/opfamio/FA-34/FA34.htm>; Internet; accessed on 20 January 2007. Note the HRC website is password protected at this time, however, all data included in this paper is not labeled for restricted use or distribution.

⁴⁵ Borghardt interview. During this interview she confirmed that PGIP is once again a training program for FA34 officers. The training has fluctuated as a FA34 requirement through the years. Articles that include SIOC and PGIP training requirements include, Major Richard C. Hoehne, "Strategic Intelligence Officers Course," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 25 (Apr-Jun 1999), 37. And Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, "Officer Actions," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 30 (Jan-Mar 2004), 71. Note also the NDIC was given its new name in December 2006, formally referred to as the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC). Also the PGIP portion of the NDIC is 40 weeks, if officers complete the MSSi it becomes a 52 week program.

⁴⁶ Schein, 67-68.

⁴⁷ Borghardt interview. And Dunmire interview. MI faced the highest attrition rates in the Army compounded with the challenge of close to half of the MI officers not requesting to remain MI as their first choice during the CFDB's. The proponent felt it could not afford to "give up" any MI officers to any of the functional areas.

⁴⁸ J. Harper, "MI GOSC: Health of the Branch," briefing slides from Human Resources Command, MI Branch, Alexandria, VA, 13 March 2001.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 11. MI has always been challenged with high attrition rates. Interviews of HRC and OMCI professionals identified common themes and incentives, interviews were with Major Brian Dunmire, Human Resources Command, interview by author, 09 November 2006. And Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, OMCI, telephone interview by author 12 Feb 2007. A current product that shows attrition trends is, United States Army, Human Resources Command, "Attrition: 2005," briefing slides, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, data as of 1QTR 06.

⁵⁰ Borghardt interview. And Dunmire interview. Note that a total of four female officers have been accessed into FA34 through other than CFD Board selection, through recruiting or the appeals process.

⁵¹ Dunmire interview. And MAJ Brian Dunmire, e-mail message to author, 18 May 2007. For YG96, 263 total officers chose FA34 (1st -3rd choice); 65 officers annotated it as a 1st choice; 113 officers annotated as a 2d choice; and 85 officers annotated it as a 3rd choice. A total of 11 officers were selected. Note that in 2005 YG95 and YG96 went before the CFD Board simultaneously, my example is just a snapshot of YG96 (does not include YG95 numbers) intended to highlight that despite the fact that BR35 officers are informed they cannot depart MI they still continue to make the request.

⁵² MAJ Brian Dunmire, "FA34: Purpose, Impact, and Challenges," powerpoint briefing slides, Alexandria, VA, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 14 November 2006.

⁵³ This line specifically refers to the nonsupport and concerns voiced by SIOs. For example, in 2000 Colonel Robert Murfin had expressed non-support of the formation of FA34 and he clearly communicated to the author that he aggressively prevented FA34 billets from being incorporated into the NSA manning documents. He was adamantly against splitting MI into a "tactical" and "strategic" force due to what he termed "flat" across-echelon-support that modern, global communications enabled. It was at this time that the author learned that many SIOs in the field had not been consulted on during the 1996 Senior Leader Review Boards solution to the MI field grade accessions / creation of FA34. As a result, upon implementation SIOs either passively resisted the program and/or openly decried the program in the field. Colonel Murfin is now retired, an Armor Officer upon initial commissioning, he then transferred to MI with an AOC of 35G/Signals Intelligence. Colonel Robert Murfin (Ret) was a well respected SIO who aquired recognized expertise in Signals Intelligence. Of note he served as the Commander 703rd MI Brigade, and later as the first military officer to lead the U.S. National SIGINT Operations Center.

⁵⁴ Dunmire, "FA34: Purpose, Impact, and Challenges," 8-12. Note that Manning Priorities are driven by legislative and Army strategic goals to meet mission requirements. The Manning Priorities 1-3 are broken down in great detail by organization, billet coding and number of personnel in each BR/FA that are on active duty. The topic is covered in general terms for the purposes of this paper, to highlight key points that impact Army MI.

⁵⁵ Dunmire interview. Note that the formation of FA34 does NOT eliminate BR35 opportunities to serve at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) and get selected for joint tours and qualifications; there remains more joint positions than BR35/FA34 than can be filled.

⁵⁶ MAJ Brian Dunmire, "Strategic Intelligence (FA34) Overview: Purpose, Training and Education, and Issues," powerpoint briefing, Alexandria, VA, 04 January 2007, 7.

⁵⁷ Dunmire interview. During the interview INSCOM was used as an example to highlight the domino effect regarding FA34 billets being recoded back to BR35. For example, INSCOMs MP3 (lowest priority manning fill units) units suffer the most since MP1 and MP2 have the highest priority respectively.

⁵⁸ Dunmire Interview. And Dunmire, "FA34: Purpose, Impact, and Challenges." And MAJ Brian Dunmire, "Strategic Intelligence (FA34) Overview: Purpose, Training and Education, and Issues," Alexandria, VA, 04 January 2007.

⁵⁹ The actions taken within the FA34 community are interesting in that it reinforces the concept of defining intellectual foundations in establishing control and expertise in what

Lacquement refers to as *legitimacy* and *shared-jurisdiction* in Lacquement, 213-233. See pages 214-215; 221 for quick reference. And the action by the FA34's as a sub-culture within MI taking it upon itself to define its purpose can also be looked at from the perspective Schein lays out reference "Exhibit 5.1. The Steps of External Adaptation and Survival" in Schein, 88. Details of each step are further explored in pages 89-109.

⁶⁰ COL John E. Angevine, Senior Army FA34, telephone interview by author, 24 October 2006. And COL John E. Angevine, Senior Army FA34, interview by author, 09 November 2006.

⁶¹ COL John E. Angevine, e-mail message to author and to FA34/BR35 field grade officers as well as senior MI Army Leaders titled, "Senior Leaders: State of Affairs for FA34," 14 August 2006. And COL John E. Angevine, Senior Army FA34, interview by author, 9 November 2006.

⁶² MAJ Brian Dunmire, e-mail message to author and FA34 field grade officers titled, "Strategic Intelligence Relook," 31 October 2006. Note the OMCI e-mail was sent out to commands on 30 October 2006, on 31 October 2006 MAJ Brian Dunmire followed up with a note to FA34 officers dispersed throughout the force so they would be aware of the OMCI message, the message was included as an attachment in the 31 October 2006 e-mail.

⁶³ The terms "haves and have nots" is a phrase used within the Army and was candidly addressed regarding basic branch / command track officers and functional area officers in *What is OPMS XXI?*, 25.

⁶⁴ Schein, 116-123. Organizational consensus refers how a group creates a common language and conceptual categories that define its boundaries and identity, how it distributes power and status within the group.

⁶⁵ LTC Earnest Bazemore, OMCI USAIC, e-mail message to Combatant Commands and Army Commands, 30 October 2006, paragraph 5.

⁶⁶ Peter Guy, "Leader-Member Exchange Theory," in *Leadership: Theory and Practice: U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, Academic Year 2007: Strategic Leadership Course* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 250-253. Also within original OPMS XXI the specific issue of officers on the command track vice officers seeking opportunities outside of the command track was addressed as "the haves" and the "have nots" see *What is OPMS XXI?*, 25. Within Army MI it could be that officers outside of the command track were seen as not being fully capable, not relevant.

⁶⁷ The United States Army Official Homepage, "Today's Focus," *Stand-To!* available from <http://www4.army.mil/news/standto.php?dte=2006-09-06>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007. This article can also be accessed from the United States Army Human Resources Command, Officer Management homepage.

⁶⁸ LTC Maura A. Gillen, "Officer Personnel Management System Changes to Grow Adaptive Leaders," *Army News Service Army Public Affairs*, 5 September 2006, available from http://www4army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_idkey=9512; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. All information included is from materials released to the general public.

⁶⁹ U.S. Army Human Resources Command, *Officer Personnel Management Directorate*, available from <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/opmd/opmd.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. All information included is from materials released to the general public.

⁷⁰ Borghardt interview.

⁷¹ MG Barbara G. Fast, "Always Out Front: Commanding General's Letter to the Field, April 2006, OPMS Update," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 32 (April-June 2006), 2. And Major Brian Dunmire, HRC, interview by author 09 November 2006.

⁷² Fast, 2.

⁷³ The recommendations outlined in this paper were partially formed using Edgar Schein's model and concepts in creating Psychological Safety, see Schein, 332-333. Also note that the recommendations are a compiled and paraphrased result of multiple and diverse discussions with BR35 and FA34 officers throughout the force since 1999. Most recently, the insights of the Senior FA34 Officer, COL Angevine and the current HRC, FA34 Manager MAJ Dunmire have proved invaluable in identifying the most important strategic initiatives impacting FA34.

⁷⁴ Lacquement, 215-216.